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I. INTRODUCTION
The Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack [1] is a family of
adversarial attack methods [2], [3] for fooling classification
models, such as deep neural networks for image classification
tasks. By saturating a few pixels in a given image to their
maximum or minimum values, JSMA can cause the model
to misclassify the resulting adversarial image as a specified
erroneous target class. We propose two variants of JSMA,
one which removes the requirement to specify a target class,
and another that additionally does not need to specify whether
to only increase or decrease pixel intensities. Our experiments
highlight the competitive speeds and qualities of these variants
when applied to datasets of hand-written digits and natural
scenes.
II. JACOBIAN-BASED SALIENCY MAP ATTACK (JSMA)
Saliency maps were originally conceived for visualizing the
prediction process of classification models [4]. The map rates
each input feature x(i) (e.g. each pixel)1 on how influential it is
for causing the model to predict a particular class c = yˆ(x) =
arg maxc′ f(x)(c′), where f(x) is the softmax probabilities
vector predicted by the victim model.
One formulation of the saliency map is given as:
S+(x(i), c) =

0 if ∂f(x)(c)∂x(i) < 0 or
∑
c′ 6=c
∂f(x)(c′)
∂x(i)
> 0
−∂f(x)(c)∂x(i) ·
∑
c′ 6=c
∂f(x)(c′)
∂x(i)
otherwise
S+(·) measures how much x(i) positively correlates with c,
while also negatively correlates with all other classes c′ 6= c.
If either condition is violated, then saliency is reset to zero.
An attacker can exploit this saliency map by targeting an
adversarial class t that does not match the true class label y of
a given sample x. By increasing a few high-saliency pixels x(i)
according to S+(x(i), c = t), the modified image x′ will have
an increased prediction confidence f(x′)(t) for the adversarial
class t 6= y, and thus might result in misclassification.
Alternatively, one can attack by decreasing feature values
based on another saliency map S−(·), which differs from
S+ only by the inversion of the low-saliency inequalities, i.e.
S−
(
x(i), t
)
= 0 if ∂f(x)(t)∂x(i) > 0 or
∑
c 6=t
∂f(x)(c)
∂x(i)
< 0.
In practice, both saliency measures S+ and S− are overly
strict when applied to individual input features, because
1We use the notation v(i) to denote the i-th element of the vector v.
x S+(x, t = 8) (p∗, q∗) x′
yˆ(x′) = 8yˆ(x) = 0
⇒ ⇒ ⇒
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iterate
Fig. 1: Illustration of JSMA+F algorithm.
often the summed gradient contribution across all non-
targeted classes
∑
c′ 6=c
∂f(x)(c′)
∂x(i)
will trigger the minimal-
saliency criterion. Thus, the Jacobian-based Saliency Map
Attack (JSMA) [1] alters these saliency measures to search
over pairs of pixels (p, q) instead.
Given a unit-normalized input x, JSMA initializes the search
domain Γ over all input indices. Then, as illustrated in Fig. 1,
it finds the most salient pixel pair (p∗, q∗), perturbs both values
(by θ = +1 if using S+, or θ = −1 if using S−), and
then removes saturated feature indices from Γ. This process
is repeated until either the model misclassifies the perturbed
input x′ as the target class t or till a maximum number of
iterations Imax is reached.
Carlini and Wagner [5] proposed an alternation that am-
plifies the logit Z(x)(t) rather than the softmax probability
f(x)(t). We denote these variants as JSMA+Z, JSMA-Z,
JSMA+F, and JSMA-F, based on the choices of increasing
(+) or decreasing (−) feature values, and using Z versus f .
The original authors advocated saturating perturbations θ =
±1 to find x′ with the fewest feature changes (i.e. minimal
L0 norm). In some domains such as hand-written digits, we
anecdotally note that adversaries found with θ < 1 had smaller
L2 perturbed distances and were more perceptually similar
thus less likely to be detected by humans.
Furthermore, we suggest that the maximum per-feature per-
turbation (L∞ norm) can be optionally Clip-ped to within an
-neighborhood to further limit perceptual differences, similar
to the BIM attack [6]:
Clip{x′(i)} = min
{
1, x(i) + ,max
{
0, x(i) − , x′(i)
}}
III. NON-TARGETED JSMA (NT-JSMA)
All JSMA variants above must be given a specific target
class t. This choice affects the speed and quality of the attack,
since misclassification under certain classes are harder to attain
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x S+(x, y = 0) (p∗, q∗) x′
yˆ(x′) 6= 0yˆ(x) = 0
⇒ ⇒ ⇒
low high
iterate
Fig. 2: Illustration of NT-JSMA-F algorithm, with highlighted
differences from JSMA+F.
than others, such as trying to modify a hand-written digit “1”
to look like anything other than “7” [1].
We propose a non-targeted attack formulation that removes
this target-class dependency by having the algorithm decrease
the model’s prediction confidence of the true class label
(c = y), instead of increasing the prediction confidence of
an adversarial target t 6= y. As depicted in Fig. 2, the NT-
JSMA procedure is realized by swapping the saliency measure
employed, i.e. following S− when increasing feature values
(NT-JSMA+F / NT-JSMA+Z), or S+ when decreasing feature
values (NT-JSMA-F / NT-JSMA-Z). This variant also naturally
relaxes the success criterion, such that an adversarial example
x′ only needs to not be classified as the true class y, i.e.
arg maxc f(x
′)(c) 6= y.
IV. MAXIMAL JSMA (M-JSMA)
In addition to alleviating the need to specify a target class
t, we can further alleviate the need to specify whether to only
Algorithm 1 Maximal Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack
(M-JSMA F)
Input: x ∈ [0, 1]n, (((((target class t, true class y, classifier f , Imax,
perturbation step θ= +1 ∈ (0, 1], max. perturbation bound  ∈ (0, 1]
Initialize: x′ ← x, i← 0, Γ = {1, ..., n}, η = {0, 0, ...}n
while yˆ(x′)6= t == y and i < Imax and |Γ| ≥ 2 do
γ ← 0
for every pixel pair (p, q) ∈ Γ and every class t do
α←∑k=p,q ∂f(x′)(t)∂x′
(k)
β ←∑k=p,q∑c6=t ∂f(x′)(c)∂x′
(k)
if((((
((((α > 0 and β < 0 and −α · β > γ then
(p∗, q∗), γ ← (p, q),−α · β
θ′ ←
{
−sign(α) · θ if t == y
sign(α) · θ otherwise
end if
end for
if γ == 0 then break
x′
(p∗), x
′
(q∗) ← Clip{(x′(p∗) +θθ′)}, Clip{(x′(q∗) +θθ′)}
Remove p∗ from Γ if x′
(p∗) /∈ (0, 1) or η(p∗) == −θ′
Remove q∗ from Γ if x′
(q∗) /∈ (0, 1) or η(q∗) == −θ′
η(p∗), η(q∗) ← θ′
i← i+ 1
end while
Return: x′
increase or decrease feature values. The resulting Maximal
Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (M-JSMA) combines
targeted and non-targeted strategies and considers both the
increase and decrease of feature values. As shown in Algo-
rithm 12, at each iteration the maximal-salient pixel pair is
chosen over every possible class t, whether adversarial or not.
Also, instead of enforcing low-saliency conditions via S+ or
S−, we simply identify the most salient pair (p∗, q∗) according
to either map, and consequently decide on the perturbation
direction θ′ accordingly. An additional history vector η is
added to prevent oscillatory perturbations. As for NT-JSMA,
M-JSMA terminates when the predicted class for x′ no longer
matches the true class.
V. EVALUATION
We trained classifiers following the baseline MNIST archi-
tecture introduced in [7], which is depicted in Fig. 3. The
test-set accuracies of our baseline models for MNIST [8],
Fashion-MNIST [9], and CIFAR10 [10] are 99.53%, 92.38%,
and 84.53%, respectively.
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Fig. 3: Architecture for baseline MNIST classifier model. [7]
We applied the various JSMA variants to all correctly-
classified test-set instances, using Imax = ∞. Each
model+dataset attack run is evaluated on its success rate (%),
the average L0 distance (which also reflects convergence speed
when θ = ±1), the average L2 perceptual distance, and the
average softmax entropy (H) reflecting misclassification un-
certainty. To compare best-case performance, when evaluating
targeted attacks on each sample, we focus on the single target
class that results in misclassification in the fewest iterations
possible. Samples of adversarial examples are shown in Fig. 4.
A. JSMA vs. NT-JSMA vs. M-JSMA
Looking at the average L0 statistics reflecting perceptual
similarity and convergence speed in Table I, we observe that
across all 3 datasets it is consistently faster to find adversaries
by increasing pixel intensities rather than decreasing them.
We also note that M-JSMA F found adversaries with similar
number of pixel changes (and thus in similar number of
TABLE I: Comparison of ±F variants (|θ| = 1,  = 1).
Attack MNIST F-MNIST CIFAR10% L0 L2 H % L0 L2 H % L0 L2 H
JSMA+F 100 16.9 3.26 0.58 99.9 17.0 3.17 0.98 100 15.0 2.24 1.10
JSMA-F 100 18.5 3.30 0.62 99.9 31.1 2.89 0.90 100 16.6 1.59 1.05
NT-JSMA+F 100 17.6 3.35 0.64 100 18.8 3.27 1.03 99.9 17.5 2.36 1.16
NT-JSMA-F 100 19.7 3.44 0.70 99.9 33.2 2.99 0.98 99.9 19.6 1.68 1.12
M-JSMA F 100 14.9 3.04 0.62 99.9 18.7 3.42 1.02 99.9 17.4 2.16 1.12
2Algorithm 1 contrasts with the original JSMA+F [1], where blue text
denotes additions for M-JSMA andred text denotes omitted parts of JSMA+F.
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Fig. 4: Samples of adversarial examples found by various JSMA variants, along with various evaluation metrics: L0 for
convergence speed, L0 and L2 for perceptual similarity, and softmax entropy H for prediction uncertainty of the adversaries.
iterations) compared to JSMA+F. On the other hand, the non-
targeted variants consistently took one or two more iterations
than their targeted counterparts.
Considering next the perceptual similarities as measured by
average L2 statistics, our results showed strong preferences
for the pixel-decreasing variants, JSMA-F and NT-JSMA-F.
This can be attributed to the fact that most images from the
3 datasets have dark backgrounds. Also, although adversaries
found by M-JSMA F had the smallest perceptual similarity
scores for MNIST, results for other datasets did not reflect
TABLE II: Comparison of ±F variants (|θ| = 0.1,  = 0.5).
Attack MNIST F-MNIST CIFAR10% L0 L2 H % L0 L2 H % L0 L2 H
JSMA+F 100 41.6 1.95 0.79 99.9 30.4 0.61 0.94 100 23.6 0.60 1.02
JSMA-F 80.3 44.7 2.24 0.81 99.2 48.5 1.16 0.89 100 22.8 0.58 1.01
NT-JSMA+F 99.9 36.5 1.93 0.86 99.5 32.5 0.64 1.01 99.3 26.3 0.63 1.12
NT-JSMA-F 54.2 34.6 1.98 0.89 94.5 48.6 1.15 0.95 96.2 24.9 0.59 1.11
M-JSMA F 98.2 31.5 1.71 0.85 99.5 30.3 0.60 0.98 98.4 23.3 0.54 1.08
similar benefits. Furthermore, we note again that NT-JSMA
had slightly worse L2 statistics compared to JSMA.
Finally, analyzing the uncertainties of adversarial predic-
tions as reflected by average entropy H statistics, we see
that the original targeted JSMA formulations consistently
found adversaries with lower-uncertainty predictions, espe-
cially compared to the non-targeted variants. Nevertheless,
adversaries found by Maximal JSMA still showed competitive
H values on average.
Based on the results above, we conclude that the flexiblity
of not specifying a target class in NT-JSMA resulted in minor
added inefficiencies in terms of both convergence time and
quality of adversaries. On the other hand, as M-JSMA consid-
ered all possible class targets, and both S+ and S− metrics
and perturbation directions, it inherited both the performance
benefits and flexibilities among all other variants.
B. Effects of Smaller Feature Perturbations
By perturbing features at increments of |θ| = 0.1 and
bounding L∞ to  = 0.5, Table II shows that all variants found
adversaries with smaller perceptual differences (i.e. smaller
L2), albeit requiring more search time (i.e. larger L0). Also,
M-JSMA resulted in stellar convergence speeds and quality
of adversaries compared to the other variants across datasets.
Thus, we conclude that regardless of whether adversaries with
fewer feature changes (L0) or smaller Euclidean distances
(L2) are desirable according to a given application domain,
M-JSMA performed favorably over other variants.
C. Performance under Defensive Distillation
Defensive distillation [7] is an adversarial defense method
that re-trains a model using ground truth labels that are no
longer one-hot-encoded, but rather using softmax probabili-
ties resulting from the original model’s logits divided by a
temperature constant T . At inference time, T is reset back to
1. As result, the gradients of the model approaches 0 as T
increases, which is a form of gradient masking [11]–[13].
To test the effects of this adversarial defense strategy, we
distilled our baseline models at T = 1 (plain non-defensive
distillation) and T = 100. The resulting classifiers at T = 1
on MNIST, F-MNIST, and CIFAR10 had test-set accuracies
of 99.39%, 91.92%, and 83.19%, respectively, while the ac-
curacies for the distilled models at T = 100 were 99.44%,
91.81%, and 83.55%, respectively.
Table III presents four sets of results that contrast softmax-
layer attacks versus logit-layer attacks, and for the plainly-
distilled T = 1 and defensively-distilled T = 100 temper-
atures. We begin by noting that the first block of results
closely resemble statistics from Table I. This suggests that
TABLE III: Comparison of {±F,±Z} variants (|θ| = 1,  =
1) on defensively distilled models with T ∈ {1, 100}.
Attack T MNIST F-MNIST CIFAR10% L0 L2 H % L0 L2 H % L0 L2 H
JSMA+F 1 100 17.9 3.23 0.79 100 17.5 3.16 1.09 100 15.5 2.16 1.28
JSMA-F 1 100 16.9 3.18 0.84 100 32.3 2.96 1.00 100 19.3 1.84 1.24
NT-JSMA+F 1 100 18.8 3.31 0.84 100 18.9 3.25 1.13 100 18.6 2.27 1.34
NT-JSMA-F 1 100 17.8 3.28 0.93 100 34.2 3.06 1.06 100 23.5 1.95 1.31
MJSMA F 1 100 14.1 2.93 0.82 100 18.8 3.38 1.12 100 19.1 2.27 1.31
JSMA+Z 1 100 52.0 5.19 0.60 100 45.1 5.10 0.95 100 42.2 3.24 1.36
JSMA-Z 1 99.1 44.5 4.79 0.66 95.4 88.5 5.07 0.89 100 54.3 2.93 1.38
NT-JSMA+Z 1 100 20.0 3.47 1.14 99.9 19.6 3.41 1.29 99.9 22.6 2.50 1.61
NT-JSMA-Z 1 100 19.0 3.42 1.20 99.8 39.1 3.29 1.29 100 28.6 2.18 1.61
M-JSMA Z 1 100 15.3 3.06 1.01 99.9 22.0 3.69 1.25 100 25.7 2.61 1.41
JSMA+F 100 0.1 2.6 0.89 0.00 2.6 3.6 0.95 0.03 4.5 2.9 0.95 0.03
JSMA-F 100 0.1 2.1 0.97 0.00 2.6 4.0 0.91 0.04 5.0 3.0 0.65 0.03
NT-JSMA+F 100 0.1 2.4 0.85 0.00 2.7 3.6 0.95 0.03 4.6 2.9 0.96 0.03
NT-JSMA-F 100 0.1 2.1 1.01 0.00 2.8 4.0 0.93 0.03 5.0 3.0 0.65 0.03
M-JSMA F 100 0.1 2.0 0.97 0.00 2.6 3.3 1.10 0.02 4.8 2.8 0.79 0.03
JSMA+Z 100 100 37.1 4.43 0.01 100 32.5 4.40 0.02 100 46.8 3.48 0.04
JSMA-Z 100 98.7 42.4 4.55 0.01 95.6 58.0 3.86 0.04 100 59.8 3.21 0.05
NT-JSMA+Z 100 100 16.2 3.33 0.02 100 21.5 3.58 0.03 100 23.6 2.56 0.04
NT-JSMA-Z 100 100 19.8 3.52 0.02 100 39.8 3.26 0.05 100 27.3 2.13 0.04
M-JSMA Z 100 100 14.7 3.09 0.02 99.6 28.0 3.92 0.03 100 27.1 2.70 0.04
non-defensive distillation has minimal effects on adversarial
attacks like JSMA.
Looking at the second block-row next, we observe that
adversaries found by attacking the logit layers ({±Z}) consis-
tently suffered from poorer perceptual similarities, as reflected
by larger average L0 and L2 statistics.
Moving on, we see that all the F attack variants failed
to break defensively distilled models (T = 100), which is
consistent with reports by [5] and [7]. Although there is a
modification of JSMA proposed by [14] that can circumvent
defensive distillation by dividing the logits of the distilled
model by a temperature constant, we do not assume knowledge
of the defense strategy used by the target model. However, in
contrast to findings of [5], all Z attack attempts were able to
fool these distilled models. Although the resulting statistics
do not point to a single dominant variant, NT-JSMA±Z
and M-JSMA Z both found adversaries with similarly small
perceptual differences in comparably few iterations, while the
targeted JSMA±Z trailed behind consistently.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We introduced Non-Targeted JSMA and Maximal JSMA
as more flexible variants of the Jacobian-based Saliency Map
Attack [1], for finding adversarial examples both quickly
and with limited perceptual differences. Most notably, M-
JSMA subsumes the need to specify the target class and the
perturbation direction. We empirically showed that M-JSMA
consistently found high-quality adversaries among a variety of
image datasets. With this work, we hope to raise awareness
of the ease of generating adversarial examples, and to develop
better understandings of attacks so as to defend against them.
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